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Recent Developments 
Troxel v. Granville: 
The Supreme Court Again Affirms the Fundamental Right to Parent 
D eaffmningacitizen's 
ftfimdamental right to parent, 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that a 
state statute's application violated the 
Due Process Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution in Troxel v. Granville, 
120 S.Ct. 2054 (2000). The 
Supreme Court ruled that a statute 
providing any third party the right to 
petition the court for visitation, without 
a showing ofharm or potential harm 
to the children, was a violation of a 
parent's fimdamental right to rear their 
children. Id. 
Tommie Granville (''Respondenf') 
andBradTroxelhadt\\Uchildren together 
out of wedlock; however, in 1993, Brad 
Troxel committed suicide. Following the 
death of the father, the paternal 
grandparents, Jennifer and Gaiy Troxel, 
("Petitioners) were originally granted 
regular visits by the Respondent. 
However, in October 1993, these visits 
were limited in both frequency and 
duration. Two months following the 
visitation restrictions, Petitioners f:tled for 
visitationina WashingtonSuperiorCourt 
under section 26.10.160(3) of the 1994 
Washington Revised Code ("the statute''). 
Id Section 26.1 0.160(3) provides: 
"Any person may petition 
the court for visitation rights 
at any time including, but 
not limited to, custody 
proceedings. The court 
may order visitation 
rights for any person 
when visitation may serve 
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the best interest of the 
child whether or not there 
has been any change in 
circumstances." 
In a 1995 oral ruling, the 
Washington trial court ordered that the 
Petitioners be granted visitation. The 
Washington Court of Appeals 
reversed, finding that a nonparent did 
not have standing to seek visitation. 
The Supreme Court ofWashington 
affirmed the court of appeals on 
different grounds, finding the statute 
violated the U.S. Constitution. Upon 
petition, the U.S. Supreme Court 
granted certiorari. 
In the plurality opinion, Justice 
O'Connor, joined by the ChiefJustice, 
Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer, 
held that the application of the statute 
violated the Due Process Clause. !d. 
at 2056. Their analysis began by 
acknowledging that the traditional 
American family is substantially 
different today than it was in the past. 
!d. at 2059. Most significant is that 
28% percent of minor children in the 
United States reside in single parent 
homes. !d. The Supreme Court 
pointed out that as a result of the 
alterations in the average family, 
''persons outside the nuclear family are 
called upon with increasing frequency 
bassist in the everyday tasks of child 
rearing." !d. Due to this societal shift 
in child-rearing, statutory rights now 
encompass "third party interests" in 
a minor child. !d. The Supreme 
Court went on to advise that these 
types of statutes, enacted throughout 
the country, have the potential to 
place an enormous burden on "the 
traditional parent -child relationship." 
!d. Further, these statutes give rise 
to constitutional questions as 
presented in this case. !d. 
Reviewing the 5th Amendment, 
as incorporated to the states through 
the 14th Amendment, Justice 
0' Connor explained that substantive 
due process, as discussed in 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 
"provides heightened protection 
against government interference with 
certain fundamental rights and liberty 
interests." !d. at 2060 (quoting 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 
U.S. 702, 719, 117 S.CT. 2258 
(1997)). The fundamental liberty 
interest of parents to care for and be 
in control of their child was 
established some 75 years ago. !d. 
(Citing, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 390, 399, 401, 43 S.Ct. 625 
(1923) which held that parental rights 
to "establish a home and bring up 
children" and "to control the 
education of their own" was 
protected by the Due Process 
Clause). 
Relying heavily on precedent, 
the Court reiterated that "it cannot 
now be doubted that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
protects the fundamental right of 
parents to make decisions concerning 
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the care, custody, and control of their 
children." !d. at 2061. The Supreme 
Court described the application of 
the statute as "breathtakingly 
broad" because it essentially gave 
sole power to the judge in 
determining the child's best 
interest, while giving no deference 
to parental opinions. !d. The statute 
allowed the court to eliminate any 
parental decision involving 
visitation when a third party 
petitions that court. !d. 
Reaffirming the fundamental 
right to parent, the plurality 
examined the Washington statute. 
ld. at 2061. The court put a great 
amount of emphasis on the fact that 
the Respondent had never been 
deemed an unfit parent. Citing 
precedent, the Supreme Court held 
that "there is a presumption that fit 
parents act in the best interests of 
their child." Id. (quoting Parham 
v. JR., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1977)). 
Specifically at issue was the 
Supreme Court's concern with the 
fact that no consideration was ever 
given to what the Respondent 
believed was in her children's best 
interests. !d. at 2062. In fact, after 
quoting the superior court judge 
verbatim, the Supreme Court stated 
that the judge presumed the 
opposite. !d. The Court found that 
the trial court never considered this 
presumption of a right to parent, but 
rather held that the child's best 
interest would be served by them. 
The trial court also did not address 
the adverse impact, thereby failing 
to protect the constitutional right of 
the Respondent to make choices 
concerning her children. Id. This 
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further meant that the burden of 
disproving "best interests" was placed 
on the Respondent. !d. 
The mother never sought to 
completely eliminate the 
grandparents' visitation. ld. at 
2063. Rather, she sought only to 
limit it to one visit per month and 
"special holidays." Id. The Court 
pointed out that even throughout the 
various court proceedings, the 
Respondent maintained her position 
that her goal was not to do away 
with visitation, but rather limit the 
visits. Id. The superior court's 
interpretation of the statute "gave no 
weight to Granville's having 
assented to visitation." !d. 
Additionally, the Superior Court 
did not even consider a settlement 
"on middle ground." !d. 
For the foregoing reasons, the 
Supreme Court ruled in favor of 
parental rights when it held that the 
Washington statute was 
unconstitutional in its application. 
!d. at 2064. The Supreme Court 
declined the opportunity to consider 
whether "all non-parental visitation 
statutes" must require a showing of 
harm in order to pass the test of 
constitutionality in light of the Due 
Process Clause. ld. 
Justices Souter and Thomas 
concurred in the judgment and both 
agreed that the fundamental right of 
parents to raise and nurture their 
children is protected by the. Due 
Process Clause of the 14th 
Amendment. Id. at 2066, 2068. 
Justices Stevens, Scalia, and 
Kennedy dissented in the judgment. 
!d. at 2068-2079. Justice Scalia 
opined that raising children is an 
"unalienable Right" granted by the 
Declaration oflndependence. !d. at 
2074. Justice Scalia further stated 
that this right comes under the 
purview of the 9th Amendment 
which states that enumerated rights 
granted by the Constitution "shall not 
be construed to deny or disparage." 
!d. According to Justice Scalia, no 
power has been granted to him by 
the Constitution "to deny legal effect 
to laws that infringe upon what is 
an unenumerated right." !d. Justice 
Kennedy believed that this matter 
should have been remanded because 
the Supreme Court ofWashington 
never addressed the "specific 
visitation order the Troxels 
obtained." Id. at 2079. Justice 
Stevens believed that the Court should 
have denied certiorari. !d. 
There should be a required 
threshold standard for proving harm 
before an outsider can inject 
themselves into another family. The 
nuclear family is arguably no longer 
the predominant model due to the 
prevalence of divorce in our 
society. The continued conflict 
between family members makes it 
vital that the fundamental right of 
parents be protected. A showing of 
harm or potential harm to a child 
provides a state the constitutional 
means for intervention within its 
parens patriae function. The 
Supreme Court has now acted on 
behalf of fit parents throughout the 
country, possibly halting the 
devastating impact that broad third 
party visitation statutes may have 
on good and decent parents. 
Maryland does not have a 
statute as broad as the one at issue 
in this case. However, Maryland's 
most applicable statute, section 9-
102 of the Family Law Article of 
the Annotated Code of Maryland 
lacks an explicit threshold standard. 
Therefore, the Supreme Court's 
decision in Troxel v. Granville may 
very well impact the state directly. 
Courts now must be conscientious 
of this ruling and conduct themselves 
accordingly. The Supreme Court 
plurality opinion in Troxel is 
unambiguous in its animus toward 
courts and judges that neglect the 
presumption that a parent acts in the 
best interest of their child absent a 
showing of harm or potential harm. 
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